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Abstract
We test how labour markets adjust to large, but temporary, economic shocks in a context
in which such shocks are common. Using an individual-level panel, from 1,140 Philippine
municipalities over 26 quarters, we find that workers in areas affected by strong typhoons
experience reductions in hours worked and hourly wages, without evidence of layoffs. The re-
sults are strongest for formal, wage-paying jobs. We argue that those results are best explained
by implicit contracts where workers and firms share risks. We provide extensive qualitative
data suggesting that employment contracts in the Philippines allow for such flexibility.
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I Introduction
How do labour markets adjust to large economic shocks? A large literature has looked at the re-
sponse of wages and employment to labour productivity shocks. Nominal wage rigidities have
been shown to prevent labour markets from clearing after economic shocks, leading to excess un-
employment (Bewley, 1999; Kaur, 2014). These rigidities can have negative welfare consequences,
especially in developing countries, where social safety nets are less common. The extent to which
labour markets are able to adjust to shocks - particularly large environmental shocks - can thus
determine their overall impact (Dell et al., 2014; Hsiang and Jina, 2014).
Testing for the existence of downward nominal wage rigidities, or lack thereof, is challenging.
Few studies have been able to account for issues related to aggregation bias due to changes in the
composition of job types or the workforce that might accompany shocks, including changes due
to migration and labour supply (Keane et al., 1988; Bils, 1985). Such evidence requires not only
plausibly exogenous labour demand shocks (for which there is sufficient variation over time and
space), but also shocks large enough to affect the marginal revenue product of non-agricultural
labour. If wage adjustments are short-lived, high-frequency data may be required to track the
effects of shocks over time. Evidence from non-agricultural contexts in developing countries is
particularly limited.
We overcome these challenges by leveraging a unique series of nationally representative labour
force surveys in the Philippines, which cover more than 3.4 million individuals in 1,140 munici-
palities over 26 quarters between 2003 and 2009. Further we use a individual panel dataset formed
of a substantial subset of individuals who were interviewed more than once. We combine this
data with geo-referenced data on the path and strength of typhoons over the same period. Control-
ling for time and municipality fixed effects, we utilize the arguably exogenous nature of typhoon
occurrence to estimate how labour markets adjust to large, but temporary, labour demand shocks.
First, we use the municipal-level data to show that large storms act as short-lived labour demand
shocks. We find that large storms do not affect employment rates, but lead to a 7 percent reduction
in per capita wage income. This impact on incomes is driven by a reduction in both the average
number of hours worked per worker and in the average hourly wage. Those impacts are short-
lived, as the estimated effects are no longer significant after one-quarter. There are many channels
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through which storms can have an impact on the marginal revenue product of labour, including
the destruction of capital and infrastructure, or a decline in prices due to disruptions to trade or
local consumer demand. We cannot distinguish between these channels: indeed a large literature
on natural disasters suggests that many of these factors could be at play. Instead, we look at how
labour market conditions are affected in the aggregate by such shocks while accounting for possible
changes in labour supply.
Second, we use individual-level data to establish that nominal wages exhibit downward flexibil-
ity when storms hit. We find large and significant negative impacts on average weekly wages while
confirming that there is no effect on employment rates.1 The impact on weekly wages is driven
by reductions in both the number of days worked and the number of hours worked per day. The
adjustment in hours per worker is not due to some workers taking zero hours of work, or to tem-
porary lay-offs (Feldstein, 1976). We find no evidence of labour market failures: labour markets
seem to clear in times of shock, with no impact on rates of employment, unemployment, labour
force participation or demand for additional labour hours.
Third, we explain our results through a combination of theoretical insights from the implicit
contracting literature, and through detailed qualitative work, in the form of focus group discussions
that we organised with workers and managers in the aftermath of a recent typhoon. We argue that
firms and workers engage in risk sharing in the event of large demand shocks. Workers in long-
term employment relationships accept cuts in total wages when shocks hit, while firms insure them
against the risk of lay-offs, which would leave them with no income at a time of great need. No
layoffs occur if wages are flexible enough, and when firms are relatively indifferent between cutting
hours to worker and laying off workers.2 Qualitative evidence suggests that employment contracts
would allow for such flexibility: built on trust, bonus systems introduce profit sharing, which can
allow wages to adjust. Workers take a few days work off voluntarily to do repairs but otherwise
return to work as normal. There is no evidence of delayed payment. We draw on other literature on
the Philippine labour market to explain how cultural norms could sustain such implicit contracting
arrangements.
We show that the results are strongest, and exhibit the clearest evidence of downward flexibility,
in permanent, non-agricultural private sector wage-paying jobs. The results do not seem to be
driven by jobs that are governed by spot markets, which we interpret as wage flexibility within
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jobs with longer-term relationships that are likely to be governed by implicit contracts.
Fourth, we rule out channels related to changes in sample, workforce or sectoral composition.
Our main concern is that migration may have altered the composition of the people for whom we
observe wages in typhoon-quarters, which could drive our results.3 However, show that shocks do
not appear to systematically affect the composition of individuals in the sample, the composition
of employed individuals or the composition of individuals who report a wage. We find no evidence
that storms have an impact on our sample sizes in the months that they fit. Most importantly,
we study our panel of individuals that we observe in employment in at least two periods, in the
same location. These are individuals that we know have not migrated as result of the shock. We
find that, even in this restricted subsample, individuals are no less likely to be employed but that,
conditional on working, wages are lower during quarters when storms hit. The results related to
wages are robust to further restricting the panel to individuals who are employed in similar jobs and
on similar contracts across the sample period. Those results allow us to rule out the possibility that
the evidence for downward nominal wage flexibility is driven by changes in sample composition,
or in the composition of job types or employment contracts.
Our results have a number of implications for the literature. First, we contribute to a growing
literature on the impacts of large natural disasters, particularly those driven by climate change and
weather (Dell et al., 2014). Our results suggest that large storms have large impacts on total output
in the short run. We estimate that affected municipalities lose 7 per cent of total aggregate income.
Yet, contrary to the literature, we find little evidence that these effects persist, perhaps because the
labour market develops adaptive mechanisms since such shocks are common.4
Second, we contribute to the literature on the identification of wage flexibility during economic
shocks. We overcome the econometric challenge of identifying wage flexibility by avoiding prob-
lems related to aggregation bias, whereby changes in the composition of the labour force might
be driving or dampening changes to nominal wages (Abraham and Haltiwanger, 1995). Panel data
allow us to guard against changes in the composition of the sample.5 Unlike other papers which
find evidence of wage rigidity (Kaur, 2014; Holzer and Montgomery, 1993), we find that wages do
adjust downwards. This could be due to differences in our setting. Ours is one of the first papers, to
our knowledge, to look at wage flexibility, across all wage-paying sectors, in a developing country.
Also, the shocks caused by typhoons are unusually large and readily observable.
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Third, we contribute to the literature on the effects of implicit contracts on labour market ad-
justments. The theoretical and empirical literature has focused on long-term labour contracts as a
source of inflexibility in labour markets (Azariadis and Stiglitz, 1983; Holmstrom, 1983; Shimer,
2005; Beaudry and Dinardo, 1991; Hall and Milgrom, 2008). Yet, we find evidence that downward
wage flexibility is strongest among individuals in long-term, formal sector wage-paying jobs. This
suggests that long-term relationships can allow for more flexibility, rather than less.
We argue that our results cannot be driven primarily by shifts in labour supply. We find no
evidence that labour supply increases when storms hit, as has been found for farming households
that use wage labour markets to smooth income in bad times (Jayachandran, 2006; Kochar, 1999).6
Yet destruction caused by storms to homes and farms requires time to rebuild (Anttila-Hughes and
Hsiang, 2013) and reduces income from non-wage sources. Therefore, we speculate that workers
may simultaneously have a greater need for both income and time off work when storms hit.
Our finding that there is no change in employment or self-reported labour supply, but reductions
in hours and hourly wages, is consistent with our model of implicit contracts. Labour supply
elasticity at the intensive margin can be high for individuals who are already working long hours,
but highly inelastic at the extensive margin, because workers need their paychecks in the absence
of unemployment insurance or good alternatives.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the context and data.
Section III establishes that strong typhoons have large but temporary negative effects on labour
markets. Section IV discusses the results within a theoretical framework. Section V presents
further findings that are consistent with the theoretical framework and rules out alternative mecha-
nisms. Section VI concludes.
II Context and Data
A Typhoons in the Philippines
The Philippines is an ideal setting for our analysis. Typhoons are a regular occurrence and generate
large welfare costs (Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013; Bankoff, 2002; Ugaz and Zanolini, 2011).
While data on total damages generated by each storm are available (cf. Table A.54), we need
to compute municipality-specific measures of storm exposure. We leverage data from the Japan
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Meteorological Agency Tropical Cyclone Database. The database provides information on each
tropical storm passing through the North-West Pacific Ocean from 2000 to 2010.8 The data takes
the form of geo-referenced observations at six-hour intervals of each storm’s lifespan, including
pressure readings and maximum wind speeds for the storm at each point.
The process to compute municipality-specific measures of storm exposure involves three steps.
First, for each storm, we apply a model of wind-speed decay to compute the maximum wind speed
that affected the municipality (Holland, 1980).9 Second, using the time-storm data, we assign the
wind-speed readings during a storm to one of the three-month periods preceding each of the 26
rounds of employment data described below. Third, we aggregate the measures across the three-
month time periods. For each municipality and for each three-month time period, we take the
maximum typhoon wind that the municipality was exposed to.
[FIGURE A.2 HERE.]
[TABLE 1 HERE.]
These wind data can then be used to generate various measures of storm intensity by time period
according to the Saffir-Simpson classification. This scale classifies hurricane wind speeds into five
categories according to the types of damage they will cause. Our main regressions will distinguish
between Category 1-3 and Category 4-5 storms. Both Category 4 and 5 storms are said to cause
catastrophic damage.10
Table 1 gives some indication of the damage caused by the storms in our sample using this
system, looking at averages across all municipalities and all time periods. We show the results for
all three levels at which we conduct estimation: Municipality, Individual and Panel datasets. The
incidence of storms is similar across these datasets. The biggest wind speed experienced was 157
knots (180 miles per hour). On average, 18.8 per cent of the quarterly municipality observations
are affected by a tropical storm, but about a third of those are too small to be classified on the
Saffir-Simpson scale.11 Across the country, 23 of the 26 quarters for which we have employment
data experienced storms. Fifteen quarters experienced storms that registered on the Saffir-Simpson
scale, and nine of those quarters were classified as catastrophically damaging (category 4 & 5).
In total 1.6% per cent of our quarterly municipal observations reported very large storms (Saffir-
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Simpson category 4 or 5), across 14 different large storms. Importantly, as shown in Figure A.1,
the storms are not concentrated in a limited number of quarters.
In Figure A.2 we plot the five typhoons that passed through during September-December 2006,
the most active typhoon season during our study period. During this time 18 per cent of mu-
nicipalities experienced catastrophic damage, and 30 per cent had some experience of typhoons.
Storm Chebi (620) clearly registers the greatest damage as it passed through the centre of Luzon,
while Storm Durian (621) reached the southern shores of Luzon. The municipalities are coloured
according to the Saffir-Simpson score of the biggest storm passing through during the quarter.
B Employment data
We use LFS data collected by the National Statistics Office (NSO) of the Philippines. The surveys
are conducted four times a year (January, April, July and October), and we have access to all 26
surveys in the period July 2003 to October 2009.12 We only use working-age individuals (above
15) and are left with 3.4 million observations.
We use the dataset in three ways. First, we aggregate the individual-level data to build a balanced
panel of 1,140 cities and municipalities across the 26 quarters. Second, we use the repeated cross-
section of individuals. Third, we extract a panel of individuals from the cross-section. A number
of households were interviewed more than once. We then use information on gender, age and
education level within households to build a panel of individuals.
A person is considered employed if s/he reported working for at least an hour during the week
prior to the survey. In addition, information is collected on the total number of hours worked
during the past week, the sector of employment and the daily wage. We compute the employment
ratio as a share of the working-age population rather than as a share of the economically active
population.13
Our main measures of earnings are at the weekly level because the reference period for earnings
and hours worked in the survey is over the last seven days. Since we have data on hours, days and
total wages over the last seven days, we are able to decompose the effects across hours, days and
hourly wages. Further, to understand how the adjustments take place, we also look at the number
of days worked and the number of hours per day worked.
Respondents provide three important pieces of data that allow us to compute the following out-
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comes: (i) Daily earnings; (ii) Average # hours worked per day during the past seven days and;
(iii) Total # hours worked during the past seven days.14 We combine them to compute hourly wage
(Daily earnings / Average # hours worked per day during the past 7 days) and weekly earnings
(Hourly wage * Total # hours worked during the past 7 days )
[TABLE 2 HERE.]
Table 2 shows the composition of these different jobs in the full individual sample and in the
panel. Roughly a third of employed individuals are self-employed (if own-farm workers are in-
cluded as self-employed), and a little more than a third are employed by private employers. The
public sector makes up about 8 per cent of employment. The rest is made up of unpaid family
work, which is mostly in agriculture, and domestic work. About half of self-employment jobs are
in agriculture, mostly labour on the households’ own farm with produce sold for income. Our data
do not measure income from self-employment or shadow wages from home production. Most of
the income data come from individuals earning wages in the private or public sector.
[FIGURE 2 HERE.]
The individual panel data show considerable variability in individual nominal wages. In Figure
2 we plot the distribution of the percentage wage changes for wage-earning individuals in periods
when storms do not hit. We compare wage changes for those who stay in jobs with identical
employment characteristics (occupation, pay-type, pay regularity, sector) versus individuals whose
job characteristics change in any way. Not surprisingly, wages are more variable when workers
change jobs, but in most quarters wages do not change at all, even for two wage observations many
quarters apart. Large drops in nominal wages are common.
We also collected detailed qualitative data on how firms adjust after typhoons hit and on the
relationships between managers and employees. We mobilised a team of researchers from the
University of the Philippines in Los Baños to carry out eight FGDs with employees and eight with
managers in the province of Camarines Sur in February/March 2017.15 We selected this area as it
was affected by a category 5 super typhoon (Nina) in late December 2016. We take advantage of
the wealth of data collected in Sections IV and V.
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III Main Results
In this Section we establish that typhoons act as a strong (but temporary) labour demand shock and
decompose the effect. We find that large storms lead to large negative effects on wages, through the
channel of lower hourly wages and lower hours per worker, with no impacts on total employment.
We start with municipal-level analysis and then move to individual-level analyses. In the next
section, we build on theoretical insights from the implicit contract literature to explain our results.
A Aggregate results
We start by estimating equations of the form:
Ympt = αSmpt + βXmpt + ump + vt + wmpt (1)
Where Ympt is the outcome of interest in municipality m in province p at time t, Smpt is a vector
of variables capturing whether municipality m has been hit by a typhoon in the previous quarter,
Xmpt is a vector of municipal characteristics that vary over time, ump is a municipality-specific
unobservable, vt is a time-specific unobservable and wmpt is the usual idiosyncratic term. Standard
errors are clustered at the provincial level.
[TABLE 3 HERE.]
Results, available in Panel A of Table 3, indicate that municipalities hit by a strong typhoon
do not experience a change in their employment rate in the quarter following the shock. That is,
labour markets do not appear to adjust along the extensive margin. Those results are robust to
adding municipal fixed effects (Column 2) and a number of quarter-specific measures of sample
composition at the municipal level: education, gender and age (Column 3). We obtain similar
results if we exclude municipalities from the southern island of Mindanao (Column 4).16 This is
our preferred set of controls and estimation sample.
Once we focus on income from employment, we find that municipalities experience a large
decline in average income in the quarter following the shocks (Panel B of Table 3). The point
estimates reported in Column 1 are very large (32 per cent), but once we control for municipal
fixed effects (Column 2), the point estimate drops to a still economically significant 6.5 per cent.
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This suggests that municipalities that tend to be hit by strong typhoons tend to be disadvantaged,
which is consistent with findings by Hsiang and Jina (2014). Once we control for time-varying
municipal controls and exclude municipalities from Mindanao the point estimates increase slightly
and are still statistically different from zero at the 1 per cent level.
A mechanical concern is that our results might be driven by disruption to survey activities due
to the storms. To reduce those concerns, we estimate the impact of storms on wages and employ-
ment, excluding all storms that happened in the month of the survey itself, and find similar results
(Column 5). If our results were driven by a disruption to surveying activities due to storms, we
would expect that the main results would change when dropping these contemporaneous storms.
[TABLE 4 HERE.]
We now decompose the effects on average income and estimate Equation (1) for a number
of other outcomes of interest using our preferred specification with municipal fixed effects, time
dummies and quarter-specific municipal controls on the non-Mindanao sample. The results are
displayed in Table 4. We show that observed average wages fall by 3.6 percentage. This effect
can be decomposed into a 2.5 per cent decline in hourly wage and a 1.1 per cent decline in hours
worked. To put it differently, at the aggregate level, labour markets adjust by lowering hourly
wages and reducing the number of hours worked.
B Individual results
Having established that large typhoons lead to a large aggregate decline in income from employ-
ment but have no effects on employment levels, we now explore how firms and their workers adjust
to these impacts. Using the full set of individual-level labour force observations, we find results that
are consistent with the results in the aggregate data. Average wages decrease after typhoons hit due
to the combination of a decline in the hours worked per week and hourly wages. Consistent with
our previous results, the effects on unemployment are very small and rarely significant. We show
that the small effects on employment that we do find are driven entirely by the self-employed.17
Employment in wage labour is not affected.
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Consistent with the aggregate results, we estimate individual-level equations of the form:
Yimt = αSmt + βXimt + um + vt + wimt (2)
Where Yimt is the outcome of interest for individual i in municipality m i at time t, Smt is a vector
of variables capturing whether municipality m has been hit by a typhoon in the previous quarter,
Ximt is a vector of individual characteristics, um is a municipality-specific unobservable, vt is a
time-specific unobservable and wint is the usual idiosyncratic term. Standard errors are clustered
at the municipal level. As above, we first estimate Equation (2) without any controls, then add
time dummies, municipal fixed effects and individual controls (education, age, age squared and
gender).
[TABLE 5 HERE.]
Individual-level results, available in Table 5, are consistent with the aggregate results discussed
above. Typhoons do not affect the probability of being employed, but average wages for employed
individuals are 2.1 per cent lower in post-storm quarters. The results are robust to dropping the
province of Mindanao (Column 4), and to dropping the months in which the survey took place in
the same month as any large storm hit (Column 5).
[TABLE 6 HERE.]
As above, we can decompose the effect of typhoons on average income (Table 6). In the quarter
after the storm, individuals report working one per cent fewer hours (Column 2), although this
effect is not significant. Hourly wages are significantly lower, by 1.4 percent (Column 4). These
two effects combined lead to the overall impact on wages in Column 1. We see a half percentage
point effect on total employment, which is marginally significant, and a similar (insignificant)
effect on days worked per week.
C Robustness
We now check that our results discussed so far are robust before explaining our results in the
context of implicit contracts. We explore robustness along multiple dimensions. These results
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are presented in the online appendix but summarized briefly here. First, we show that our re-
sults are not driven by a specific choice of parameter values used to compute our storm measures.
We re-estimate our results at the aggregate- and individual- level using permutations of both the
smoothing and radius parameters, both above and below the choice in our preferred specification.
These results are summarized for employment and earnings in Tables A.1 and A.2, and all decom-
positions are replicated in Tables A.3—A.20.18 Second, we show that our results are not driven by
any specific storm by dropping one large storm at a time from our sample for both the aggregate
(Table A.21) and individual (Table A.22) results. Importantly, we are unable to reject the null that
the point estimate in the weekly wage equation on each of those samples is different from the point
estimate on the full sample (the z-stats are between -.32 and .22). Third, our results are robust
to using alternative measures of storm strength, in particular, wind speed in knots and normalized
wind speed (Tables A.23 and A.24). Fourth, wide storms - hitting more municipalities at once -
do not appear to drive our results (Table A.25). Fifth, slow moving storms - which could be more
destructive as they spend more time on each municipality - do not generate larger effects (Table
A.26). Sixth, we find no evidence that municipalities that were hit more often, during the duration
of our study, suffered more from the large storms (Table A.27). Seventh, to deal with concerns that
household members may report inaccurate information about other household members’ salaries,
we show that our results are robust to looking at the impacts on wages of household heads only,
who are most likely to be the primary respondent in the survey (Table A.28). Again, we are unable
to reject the null that the point estimate in the weekly wage equation on the sample of household
heads is different from the point estimate on the full sample (z-stat= -.73). Finally, in Table A.30
we show that results are not driven by changes in sample size: we find no impact of small or big
storms on the number of households, people, or adults surveyed in each municipality.
D Persistence
A potential concern with our results is that they only focus on short-term impacts of the storm and
might fail to capture more relevant longer-term impacts. We now estimate Equation (1) including
lagged values of the shock variables. The results, displayed in Table 7, confirm our modelling
choice. Storms do not appear to affect labour markets after one quarter. For example, when
focusing on our main measures of economic activity, the point estimate of the shock measure
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lagged once is 60 per cent lower than it is for the current version of the shock and is no longer
statistically significant. There is a similar pattern for other outcomes of interest: the lagged term
is more than 50 per cent lower for average wages and almost 80 per cent lower for average hourly
wages. We are not always able to reject the null that the estimated effects of the current value and
the first lag are equal, but once we look at the second and third lags, the results confirm that the
impacts of storms on labour markets are short-lived. From now on we focus on the current impacts
of storms.
[TABLE 7 HERE.]
IV Theoretical Framework and Context
In this Section, we discuss a theoretical framework that explains our results and can guide further
empirical analysis. We also provide evidence in support of its main assumptions. The evidence
comes from existing literature on Philippine labor markets and from FGDs that we organised with
both managers and employees in the province of Camarines Sur in February/March 2017. We
selected this area as it was affected by a category 5 typhoon (Nina) in late December 2016. The
model is presented in the Online Appendix.
Recall that workers in areas affected by strong typhoons experience reductions in their wages,
without evidence of layoffs. We have in mind a mechanism whereby storms cause the destruc-
tion of working capital and inventory, and disruption to retail activities, leading to a reduction in
marginal revenue product of labour. Firms would like to hire less labour and to pay workers less,
especially if they are credit constrained. Profit sharing arrangements make it possible for firms to
reach those outcomes by paying higher total wages when economic activity returns to normal.
We aim to explain those results through a model of implicit contracts. Under such contracts,
workers and firms share risks when shocks to the firm occur (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975).
Miyazaki and Neary (1985) and Rosen (1985) extend the basic model to allow for flexibility in the
intensive margin of labour (hours per worker) and the extensive margin (layoffs), in which workers
may prefer to work fewer hours and receive lower pay, rather than risk being laid off. Risk-averse
workers are further compensated for low pay in bad states with higher wages in normal states.
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According to the model, flexibility in working arrangements after shocks is efficient. Negative
shocks are more likely to lead to a reduction in hours worked and wages but no increase in un-
employment under the following conditions. First, when workers’ outside options after negative
shocks are worse, they are more likely to accept the lower wages offered by firms to avoid unem-
ployment. Second, the contractual environment needs to be flexible enough to allow these changes
in wages. Third, the risk-sharing mechanism we have in mind requires trust between managers
and workers which is more likely to be present when they are engaged in reciprocal relationships.
Finally, the shocks need to be observable for state-contingent contracts to be enforceable.
We now discuss, with the use of data from our FGDs and existing literature from the Philippines,
evidence that our setting supports such flexible relationships. Despite being hit by a category 5
typhoon, managers reported not laying-off workers, but lowering their working hours. We also de-
scribe some specific contracting mechanisms that might allow for wage flexibility, without workers
and firms setting explicit wage schedules based on the arrival of typhoons.
First, there is significant evidence that typhoons have a direct negative impact on firms’ produc-
tivity and workers’ outside options. Managers who participated in our FGDs report that typhoons
generate losses of stocks and inventories of raw materials as well as difficulties in purchasing in-
puts. Importantly, typhoons also severely disrupt electricity supply and negatively affect sales.19
Given that firms are trying to reduce their wage bill, it is likely that workers face lower labor de-
mand overall. Similarly, Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang (2013) show that the agricultural sector is
negatively affected by typhoons.
Second, we find evidence for risk sharing between employers and workers. Managers in our
FGDs report that workers are paid extra for overtime (up to 30 percent) and receive bonuses when
sales are high. This suggests that total wages vary with firm profit. Recall that the effects of storms
are not persistent; wages return to normal after just one quarter. This is consistent with the notion
of implicit compensation that workers get for firms lowering their hours and wages when shocks
hit. This is not consistent with a mechanism whereby firms simply delay payment until cash flow
improves, as this would imply that total wages go up after the storms. FGD participants - both
managers and workers - confirmed that firms do not delay payments when typhoons hit. Firms
report that they understand that during storms workers may have especially acute needs for timely
wage payments for daily living. Firms say that they rely on firm savings to cover salaries during
Franklin and Labonne 15
storms.
How are flexible wage schedules implemented in practice? In our focus groups, while most
workers reported being “regular” (i.e., in long-term employment relationships), they do not have
written contracts. This allows managers to adjust their workers’ schedule at short notice and some
of them report doing so based on demand. Workers and managers are often engaged in long-
standing relational contracts. Two Filipino cultural traits make cooperation in those contracts more
likely to be sustained: (i) utang na loob, which refers to a debt of gratitude that fosters reciprocity
and feelings of social obligation; and (ii) hiya, which refers to the stigma associated with not
fulfilling one’s social obligations (Cruz et al., ming). In our qualitative fieldwork, workers indicated
that they value good relationships with their managers and that it is one of the main reason why
they are staying with their current employer. The majority of workers are hired through friends and
relatives of the managers or current employees. This increases the likelihood that cooperation will
be sustained (Jackson et al., 2012). Another cultural trait increases managers’ incentives to retain
workers: pakikiisa (feeling of oneness), which refers to a sense of shared purposed and solidarity.
It takes time to build. This is consistent with finding by Amante (1995, 1997) who argue that
Filipino employers value both loyalty and flexibility.
Finally, Rosen (1985) writes that implicit labour contracts should specify ‘precisely the amount
of labour to be utilized and the wages to be paid in each state of nature, that is, conditional on
information (random variables) observed by both parties.’ Storms are easily observable and can be
contracted upon.
V Long-term employment contracts and downward wage flex-
ibility
We present evidence that flexibility arises in established contractual employment relationships,
with strong effects observed for individuals employed on permanent contracts in the private sector,
which we interpret as being consistent with the implicit contract model introduced in Section IV.
Specifically, we show that the effects are not driven by spot markets. We also show that the effects
are not driven by changes in sample composition (including migration), sectoral reallocation, or
labour supply. We discuss further qualitative evidence on the role of labour supply of workers.
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A Wage employment in the private sector
We provide evidence consistent with the argument that downward wage flexibility is driven by
wage flexibility within wage employment contracts. First, we estimate Equation (2) but interact
the storms variable (and all other control variables) with a dummy equal to 1 for individuals in
wage employment in the private sector (on either permanent or temporary contracts). Results are
available in Panel A of Table 8. Interestingly, the base effect suggests that there is no impact
of storms outside the private sector, but the interaction term indicates that weekly wages in the
private sector decrease by 4.2 percent in the post-storm quarter. While workers outside the private
sector experience a reduction in the number of hours worked, private sector workers experience a
reduction in their hourly wage.
[TABLE 8 HERE.]
In addition, we restrict the sample to workers in wage employment in the private sector and
compare the effects for individuals employed on temporary vs. permanent contracts. Overall, we
are unable to reject the possibility that the effects on weekly wage are the same, but the adjustment
margins differ greatly (Panel A of Table 8). Indeed, while individuals on temporary contracts
reduce the number of hours worked (mostly by reducing the number of days worked), individuals
on permanent contracts do not adjust their hours but experience a 2.6 percent reduction in their
hourly wage.
The evidence suggests that the results are different between temporary and permanent jobs.
Most strikingly, permanent jobs exhibit considerable downward flexibility in hourly wages. There
is relatively little adjustment in hours worked per paid worker (Column 3). The weekly wage
adjustment for temporary jobs is not significantly different from that in permanent jobs, but the
results seem to be driven by a fall in the number of hours worked rather than by a fall in the hourly
wage.
This evidence suggests that even long-term permanent contract agreements exhibit high levels
of flexibility. These findings are consistent with the implicit contracts model discussed in Section
IV. Therefore, we do not believe that our mains results are driven by the operation of spot markets.
Conversely, results for temporary forms of employment are consistent with the behaviour of a spot
market, with highly elastic labour supply: workers reduce the number of days worked. No lay-offs
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occur for either type of jobs.
B Alternative channels
The results discussed so far suggest that nominal wages exhibit significant downward flexibility
when a typhoon hits as a result of implicit contracts between workers and firms. We now address
alternative mechanisms, including sample composition, sectoral reallocation and substitution.
1 Are the results driven by changes in sample composition?
We take advantage of the availability of panel data and show that the results are similar for indi-
viduals in the panel dataset. By construction, this set of analyses keeps the sample constant.20 We
estimate Equation (2) on the panel described in Section II.B. Panel A of Table 9 shows the main
results for the individual panel sample. Wages fall by 2.4 percent and there is no evidence that
the probability of being employed is affected by the timing of typhoons (Tables 9 and A.32).21
We are unable to reject the null that the point estimate in the weekly wage equation is different
from the point estimate on the full sample (z-stat= .22). Again, the results seem to be driven by a
combination of significant drops in hours per worker and in the hourly wage (1.9 percent).
[TABLE 9 HERE.]
We further clarify why panel data are especially useful in our context. First, while Keane et al.
(1988) have suggested that the use of panel estimators does not fully address the problem of se-
lection bias, we argue that their concerns are less valid in our case. Their argument is that if
high-skilled individuals in the panel are less likely to be employed in quarters when storms hit,
this could lead to the impression that wages are flexible downwards. However, this problem arises
in a setting in which changes in unemployment are used as the dependent variable; by definition,
these estimators examine situations with a lot of movement out of the labour force. However, this
is unlikely to explain our results, as we found no evidence that storms affect the probability of
being employed or of being engaged in different types of wage-paying work conditional on being
employed (Table A.34). Furthermore, we restrict our sample of panel observations to individuals
who we observe working in at least two periods. The vast majority of individuals are observed in
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the panel only twice. By looking at the sample of individuals who were earning in both of those
periods of the panel, we clearly document changes in their wages between the two periods.
Second, the panel data helps us deal with concerns related to aggregation bias due to migration
since we observe reductions in wages for individuals who have not migrated. Some workers might
migrate as a result of shocks but, if migration was driving our results, the results should not hold
in the panel.
Further, we check that changes in observable characteristics of respondents in the individual
cross-section is not affected by storms. We estimate Equation (2) regressing the individual-level
characteristics for which we have data (education, age and gender) on the full set of municipal and
time fixed effects and the storm dummies. We estimate each of those equations on the full sample,
on the sample of employed individuals and on the sample of wage earners. The results, available in
Table A.47, do not suggest that the timing of typhoon occurrence affects the sample composition.
Among the 24 tests carried out (gender, age and six education categories on the three samples),
we only reject the null three times and the point estimates are small in magnitude. Employed
individuals are slightly more likely to be graduates from primary school in the quarters in which
storms hit, but this increase is driven by insignificant decreases in composition of lower and higher
education levels. These results are not robust to alternative storm parameterizations.
2 Are the results driven by sectoral reallocation?
Economic shocks like those caused by large natural disasters can have large impacts on the com-
position of employment in affected areas, and can change the sectoral composition of economic
activities (Moretti, 2010; Kirchberger, 2014). If the storms studied in this paper caused sectoral
shifts toward lower-paying industries and jobs, this could be driving the effects on average wages.
While this appears unlikely since the effects discussed so far are short-lived, here we show that the
overall composition of jobs did not change in the full individual sample.
Panel A of Table A.49 shows the impacts of storms on the probability of a working individual
being employed in a particular type of job. Storms affect only one category of work: individuals are
marginally significantly less likely to be engaged in public sector work when storms hit, although
the coefficient is small. Aside from the effect on the public sector, Panel B of Table A.49 shows
that the composition of jobs across wage paying forms of employment is unaffected by storms.
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Panel C of Table A.49 reproduces the analysis on the sample of individuals earning a wage. Again,
we find that wage earners are very slightly less likely to work in the public sector.
We are confident that these small changes are not driving our main results.22 Overall, we inter-
pret this set of results to indicate that the decline in nominal wages observed in the quarter after
storms hit is not driven by sectoral reallocation. Note that, once we focus on the panel of individu-
als who we observe more than once in the data, there is no evidence that storms affect the sectoral
composition of jobs in this subsample (Table A.34).
3 Are the results driven by job switches?
A related concern is that individuals who stayed in the panel might have switched to different job
types. As above, this would generate our results without any worker experiencing a drop in hours or
income within the same job. We estimate Equation (2), further restricting the sample to individuals
who stay in similar job types throughout the sample period.23 The results, available in Panel B of
Table 9, confirm that even in this restricted sample workers experience a short-term drop in both
hours worked and hourly wages. Again, we are unable to reject the null that the point estimate in
the weekly wage equation is different from the point estimate on the full sample (z-stat= -.4)
A final concern is that individuals who did not move and stayed in similar job types might have
renegotiated their contracts – for example, by switching from permanent to temporary contracts.
To address those concerns, we restrict the sample to individuals who stayed in similar job types
and similar contract types and estimate Equation (2) on this subsample. These individuals also
remain on the same payment schedule (monthly payments, daily payments or pay on commission).
Again, results available in Panel B of Table A.35 confirm our earlier results.
4 Labour supply response
We now rule out the possibility that our results are driven by changes in labour supply. This is
important, as Jayachandran (2006) finds that large agricultural productivity shocks cause shifts
in labour supply away from farm work towards wage labour, which in turn accounts for large
reductions in wages. Similarly, Kochar (1999) shows that the hours worked increase in rural areas
as rural households attempt to smooth consumption during shocks.
In Panel A of Table A.51, we show that storms have no impact on various measures of labour
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supply. Respondents are no less likely to report being in the labour force (Column 1), no more
likely to be searching for work (whether employed or not), and no more likely to be looking for
work while unemployed. Also, there is no increase in the probability that an employed individual
will want more work (Column 5) or have searched for additional work (Column 6). This provides
strong evidence that large labour demand shocks do not result in wage rationing: labour markets
seem to clear in the wake of large shocks. In Panel B of Table A.51 we confirm that this holds
for the sample that stayed in the individual panel, with the coefficients following much the same
pattern as in the individual data. This result is important: the analysis of wages in the panel data
focused on wage earners who were observed for at least two periods.
Labour markets seem to clear at both the extensive margin (no rise in unemployment) and the
intensive margin (no rise in underemployment as measured by a demand for additional hours of
work). This is consistent with the qualitative evidence that we gathered through our FGDs. Man-
agers report that some workers require a couple of days off in the immediate aftermath of the
storms to repair their homes. In any case, this is not driving our results which our robust to drop-
ping observations where the storm hit in the month of the survey. Once this is done, workers return
to work with normal hours. In some cases, workers are asked to work on important repairs to fa-
cilities rather than on regular productive activities. Finally, workers in FGDs report that reduction
in work hours are determined by managers.
VI Conclusion
In this paper, taking advantage of a unique individual-level labour force dataset spanning 26 quar-
ters between 2003 and 2009, we explore how labour markets adjust to large economic shocks,
namely strong typhoons. Our results suggest that employment levels are unaffected but nominal
weekly wages adjust downwards, through a combination of lower hours and lower hourly wages.
The effects are driven by individuals employed on permanent contracts in the private sector and
dissipate shortly after the storms hit.
The results have implications for our understanding of labour markets in developing countries.
First, there is evidence of flexibility in established long-term contractual relationships, which is
consistent with theories of implicit contracts. Second, the adjustments take place along the in-
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tensive rather than extensive margin, which we interpret as risk sharing between the firms and the
workers. This built-in insurance mechanism seems to indicate sophisticated informal arrangements
for coping with large economic shocks. In contexts where social safety nets might be inadequate,
utility loss associated with unemployment is likely large, and it appears that considerable risk
sharing occurs between firms and workers. Third, our results are obtained in a context in which
typhoons are relatively common, and so could be thought of as an adaptive response to repeated
natural disaster shocks.
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Notes
1Since we are interested in the total wages that firms pay workers, our preferred measure is weekly wage income,
as this is the highest level of aggregation over time that we can use.
2In the model, layoffs are also less likely to happen when labour is relatively indivisible: that is when the marginal
return to adding labour hours to the existing workforce is not considerably larger that it is for adding to the total
number of works.
3 Typhoons may very well have induced out-migration (Kleemans and Magruder, 2012; Gröger and Zylberberg,
2015).
4Our findings do not estimate the impact of storms on growth trajectories or other long-term outcomes, because of
our use of municipal fixed effects, time fixed effects and quarterly data. Our results without municipal fixed effects
suggest that municipalities that are regularly hit are poorer than areas that are not (although these findings are not
necessarily causal). Therefore our findings do not conflict with the growing body of evidence showing that natural
disasters have long-term consequences for economic growth and household well-being (Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang,
2013; Hsiang and Jina, 2014).
5Keane et al. (1988) also use panel data. By contrast, Kaur (2014) argues that evidence of asymmetric responses to
positive and negative shocks is inconsistent with the possibility that the results are driven by labour supply and sample
composition changes.
6This difference is likely explained by (i) the nature of shocks in our sample, which are not only agricultural and
thus affect labour demand in the wage sector and (ii) the fact that typhoons cause the kind of catastrophic damage that
requires homes to be rebuilt.
7This is contrary to evidence from OECD countries, where changes in employment rates account for most fluctua-
tions in total hours worked (Rogerson and Shimer, 2011).
8These data can be accessed online at http://www.jma.go.jp/en/typh/, last accessed on 1 December 2012.
9We start by generating best-fit lines through the six-hourly observations to mimic the storm path. Then for each
municipality, we calculate the distance to every storm in the dataset, recover the storm track point to which it is closest,
and the corresponding storm pressure (in hPa) at the moment when the storm passed over the municipality. We then
estimate wind speeds for each municipality–storm combination (Holland, 1980). The model uses the distance from the
eye of the storm and the pressure at the eye to calculate a wind speed at any point. We discuss our parameter choices
in the Online Appendix and show that our results are robust to alternative parametrizations.
10The latest version of Saffir-Simpson hurricane classifications is outlined by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) National Hurricane Center, available online at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php,
last accessed on 1 December 2012. According to NOAA, it is expected that after a Category 5 storm, ‘a high percentage
of framed homes will be destroyed, with total roof failure and wall collapse. Fallen trees and power poles will isolate
residential areas. Power outages will last for weeks to possibly months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for
weeks or months’.
11Many wind speeds generated in this way are negligibly small and can be safely dropped because the storm passed
too far from the municipality to register an impact. We ignored all storms not registering on the Saffir-Simpson scale
(that is, those not reaching wind speeds above 60 knots).
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12More information on the survey design is available at: http://www.census.gov.ph/data/technotes/notelfs_new.html
visited on 26 March 2012.
13As discussed in Labonne (2016), the definition of the economically active population changed in April 2005, so
it is not possible to compute the employment rate as a share of the economically active population consistently across
survey waves. The information required to adjust past series is not available. However, the definition of employment
has not changed.
14The measure of daily earnings is derived differently according to how someone is paid. For workers who are paid
on an hourly basis, the daily rate is computed as their hourly rate multiplied by average working hours (per day) over
the past week. For workers who are paid monthly, the daily rate is computed as their monthly wage divided by the
number of working days per month.
15The number of FGDs is consistent with recommendations by Guest et al. (2017)
16Typhoon incidence increases with latitude in the Philippines and, historically, Mindanao has very rarely been hit
by typhoons. No municipality in Mindanao was hit by either a small or a large typhoon during the sample period, and
since employment patterns might be different there, we prefer to exclude those observations from the sample as they
do not contribute to the estimation of α.
17This finding is in line with previous studies on the effects of typhoons in the Philippines (Anttila-Hughes and
Hsiang, 2013).
18The original version of the paper used a different paramaterization and, for completeness, those results are avail-
able in Tables A.40 –A.53.
19One of the managers interviewed indicated that average daily sales went from PHP 21-25k (USD 420-520) before
the typhoon to PHP 6k (USD 120) after the typhoon.
20 Importantly, on average, individuals observed more than once do not appear to systematically differ from the rest
of the sample (Table 2). This mitigates concerns about the representativeness of the panel data.
21Given that the outcomes we are interested in are persistent and subject to measurement error, we do not estimate
an individual fixed-effects model, although the main results are robust to the use of individual fixed effects in these
regressions (see Table A.33 in the Appendix).
22 As we show in the sectoral analysis in Section IV, the impacts on income are driven by wage changes in the private
sector: the results hold even when public sector work is removing from the estimation. Self-employed wages are not
observed in this data: 99 per cent of all self-employed individuals have their wages reported as missing, and the data
does not allow us to impute income from self-employment. Finally, we find that these results on public sector work
on are not consistent across paramaterization, they do not show up when we permute our chosen parameter selection
(see, for example, Table A.50).
23The data do not allow us to distinguish between workers who have switched jobs and those who have remained in
the same job since the last quarter.
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Figures
Figure 1: Storm damage by municipality (Sept-Dec 2006)
Color version available in the online appendix
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Figure 2: Percentage in wage changes for individuals in the panel data who switch jobs and those
that stay in the same jobs (periods without storms)
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Tables
Table 1: Average municipality storm measures across all quarters (2003-2009)
Data Source Municipality Individual Panel
N= 21,064 N=2,538,621 N= 1,873,674
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Max
Max Windspeed 13.036 31.11 13.24 31.30 11.06 29.35 157.92
Standardized windspeed 0.0295 0.0978 0.0300 0.0981 0.0261 0.0957 1
Any storm-wind detected 16.93% 37.50% 17.18% 37.72% 14.17% 34.88% 1
Storm on SS-Scale 11.10% 31.41% 11.32% 31.68% 9.22% 28.93%
SS class-0 88.90% 31.41% 88.68% 31.68% 90.78% 28.93%
SS class-1 3.36% 18.02% 3.44% 18.23% 2.52% 15.67%
SS class-2 2.29% 14.96% 2.34% 15.11% 2.03% 14.10%
SS class-3 3.80% 19.13% 3.91% 19.38% 2.84% 16.61%
SS class-4 1.38% 11.68% 1.38% 11.65% 1.56% 12.39%
SS class-5 0.26% 5.11% 0.26% 5.07% 0.27% 5.21%
Big Storms (SS -4&5) 1.64% 12.72% 1.63% 12.68% 1.83% 13.41%
Small Storms (SS -1, 2&3) 9.45% 29.26% 9.69% 29.58% 7.39% 26.15%
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Individual data
Variable Full Sample Panel
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Income per capita (PHP) 383.6 (1122.1) 3,411,277 378.7 (1106.8) 1,835,793
Average Wage (PHP) 1402.5 (1781.7) 882,109 1401.6 (1760.9) 468,336
Hours per worker 40.8% (19.4) 2,048,189 40.1% (19.2) 1,158,032
Employed 58.3% (49.3) 3,411,277 61.3% (48.7) 1,835,793
Unemployed 5.6% (23.0) 3,411,277 5.0% (21.9) 1,835,793
No schooling 2.2% (14.8) 3,411,277 2.3% (15.1) 1,835,793
Some primary 14.3% (35.0) 3,411,277 15.4% (36.1) 1,835,793
Primary graduate 14.9% (35.6) 3,411,277 15.8% (36.4) 1,835,793
Some secondary 17.3% (37.8) 3,411,277 16.1% (36.7) 1,835,793
Secondary graduate 24.2% (42.8) 3,411,277 23.9% (42.6) 1,835,793
Some college 27.1% (44.5) 3,411,277 26.6% (44.2) 1,835,793
Female 0.5% (0.5) 3,411,277 0.5% (0.5) 1,835,793
Age 35.8% (16.3) 3,411,277 37.4% (15.9) 1,835,793
Composition of jobs
Wage employment 51.7% (50.0) 2,014,839 48.9% (50.0) 1,139,465
Agriculture 34.8% (47.6) 2,014,839 37.5% (48.4) 1,139,465
Key Job Types
Own farm 26.2% (44.0) 2,014,839 28.6% (45.2) 1,139,465
Wage farm 8.6% (28.0) 2,014,839 8.9% (28.5) 1,139,465
Self employed 22.1% (41.5) 2,014,839 22.5% (41.7) 1,139,465
Government 7.7% (26.6) 2,014,839 8.1% (27.3) 1,139,465
Private permanent 26.5% (44.1) 2,014,839 23.8% (42.6) 1,139,465
Private temporary 9.0% (28.6) 2,014,839 8.1% (27.2) 1,139,465
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Table 3: Aggregate-level results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Impact on Employment Rate per Adult
Big Storm 0.019 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Small Storm -0.013* 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 29,560 29,560 29,560 21,064 19,443
R-squared 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.022
Mean Dep. Var 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600
Panel B: Impact on Log Income per Adult
Big Storm -0.327*** -0.052*** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.090***
(0.085) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Small Storm 0.230*** 0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.021*
(0.071) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 28,608 28,608 28,608 20,808 19,200
R-squared 0.018 0.051 0.061 0.073 0.077
Mean Dep. Var 5.300 5.300 5.300 5.400 5.400
Mun FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agg Contr No No Yes Yes Yes
Mindanao Incl. Yes Yes Yes No No
Storm survey Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Results from weighted municipal*quarter regressions. The dependent variable is the em-
ployment rate in the municipality (Panel A) and the average wage in the municipality (Panel B).
Regressions control for time fixed effects (Column 1-4), municipal fixed effects (Column 2-4), as
well as the share of the working age population in each education category, the share of women
in the working age population, the number of men, the number of women, the number men age
15-30 and the number of women age 15-30 (Column 3-4). In Column 4, the sample is restricted
to municipalities outside of Mindanao. Column 5 drops all time periods where a super typhoon
hit the country (any municipality) in the same month that the labour force survey was being con-
ducted. The standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential correlation within province. *
denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level.
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Table 4: Decomposing the aggregate-level effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
inc/ wage/ wage/ hours/ earners/ job/
adult week hour earner job adult
Big Storm -0.067*** -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.011 -0.023 -0.008
(0.018) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.006)
Small Storm -0.008 -0.014** -0.010* -0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
Denominator Adults Earners Earned Hours Earners Jobs Adults
Observations 20,808 20,808 20,808 20,808 20,808 20,808
R-squared 0.073 0.131 0.146 0.068 0.024 0.016
Results from weighted municipal*quarter regressions. The dependent variable is the average income
from employment per adult (Column 1), the average income from employment for employed individuals
(Column 2), the average hourly wage for employed individuals (Column 3), the average number of hours
worked for employed individuals (Column 4), the proportion of individuals who had jobs who reported
a salary (Column 5), the proportion of adults who had jobs (Column 6). Regressions control for munici-
pal fixed effects, time fixed effects as well as the share of the working age population in each education
category, the share of women in the working age population, the number of men, the number of women,
the number men age 15-30 and the number of women age 15-30. The sample is restricted to municipal-
ities outside of Mindanao. The standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential correlation within
province. * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Individual-level results: Impacts on wages and employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Impact on Employment per Adult
employed employed employed employed employed
Big Storm 0.018*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005* -0.004
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Small Storm -0.014*** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 3,402,456 3,402,456 3,402,456 2,464,172 2,271,302
R-squared 0.000 0.023 0.228 0.219 0.220
Mean Dep. Var 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600
Panel B: Impact on Log of Wages
wage/ wage/ wage/ wage/ wage/
week week week week week
Big Storm -0.223*** -0.016 -0.018** -0.021** -0.028**
(0.038) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Small Storm 0.142*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006
(0.022) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 860,809 860,809 860,809 660,650 607,754
R-squared 0.013 0.216 0.444 0.446 0.446
Mean Dep. Var 6.900 6.900 6.900 7.000 7.000
Mun FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agg Contr No No Yes Yes Yes
Mindanao Incl. Yes Yes Yes No No
Storm month Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Results from weighted individual regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the individual is employed (Panel A) and log of wages for employed individuals (Panel
B). Regressions control for time fixed effects (Column 1-4), municipal fixed effects (Column 2-
4), as well as the respondent’s age, age square, education levels and gender (Column 3-4). In
Column 4, the sample is restricted to municipalities outside of Mindanao. Column 5 drops all
periods in which a Super Typhoon hit in the same month as the survey was being conducted. *
denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level.
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Table 6: Individual-level results: decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Impact on Intensive Margins (Earnings and Hours)
wage/ hours/ hours/ wage/ days/ hours/
week worker earner hour earner day
Big Storm -0.021** -0.010 -0.007 -0.014** -0.006 -0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Small Storm -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.004*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Sample Earners All Earners Earners Earners Earners
Observations 660,650 1,430,357 660,650 660,650 660,650 660,650
R-squared 0.446 0.128 0.094 0.417 0.093 0.039
Panel B: Impact on Extensive Margins
employed job wage wage zero lost job
missing observed hours quarter
Big Storm -0.005* -0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Small Storm 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Sample All All Earners All All All
Observations 2,464,172 2,464,172 1,430,353 2,464,172 2,464,172 2,464,172
R-squared 0.219 0.228 0.188 0.097 0.015 0.021
Mean Dep. Var 0.573 0.581 0.507 0.286 0.009 0.030
Notes: Results from weighted individual regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the log
weekly wage for employed individuals (Column 1), number of hours worked for employed individu-
als (Column 2), number of hours worked for employed individuals earning a wage (Column 3), hourly
wage for employed individuals (Column 4), number of days worked for employed individuals earning
a wage (Column 5), number of hours worked per day for employed individuals earning a wage (Col-
umn 6). In Panel B, the dependent variables are a series of dummies equal to one if: the individual is
employed (Column 1), the individual has a job (Column 2), the individual is employed but their wage
is not observed (Column 3), the individual reports a wage regardless of employment status (Column 4),
the individual reports having a job but working zero hours in the last 7 days (Column 5), the individual
reports not having a job now, but having worked in the last 3 months (Column 6). Regressions control
for municipal fixed effects, time fixed effects as well as respondent’s age, age square, education levels
and gender. The standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential correlation within municipality. *
denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Aggregate-level results - Persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
inc/ wage/ wage/ hours/ earners/ job/
adult week hour earner job adult
Big Storm
current -0.079*** -0.036** -0.023** -0.014 -0.029 -0.013**
(0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.006)
lag 1 -0.030 -0.017 -0.005 -0.011 -0.006 -0.007
(0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.027) (0.006)
lag 2 0.036 0.017 -0.002 0.019* 0.026 -0.008
(0.026) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.006)
lag 3 -0.036 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.012 -0.016**
(0.022) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.007)
Small Storm (lags estimated but not displayed)
current -0.014 -0.014** -0.013*** -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 20,579 20,579 20,579 20,579 20,602 20,835
R-squared 0.074 0.131 0.144 0.068 0.025 0.017
Notes: Results from weighted municipal*quarter regressions.The dependent variable is the
average income from employment per adult (Column 1), the average income from employ-
ment for employed individuals (Column 2), the average hourly wage for employed individuals
(Column 3), the average number of hours worked for employed individuals (Column 4), the
proportion of individuals who had jobs who reported a salary (Column 5), the proportion of
adults who had jobs (Column 6). Regressions control for municipal fixed effects, time fixed ef-
fects as well as the share of the working age population in each education category, the share of
women in the working age population, the number of men, the number of women, the number
men age 15-30 and the number of women age 15-30. The sample is restricted to municipalities
outside of Mindanao. The standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential correlation
within province. * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level.
Franklin and Labonne 36
Table 8: Individual-level results: A closer look at the private sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Decomposition of Impacts among Private Sector Wage Employment and Other Jobs
wage/ hours/ hours/ wage/ days/ hours/
week worker earner hour earner day
Big Storm 0.003 -0.022** -0.017 0.018 -0.025** 0.008
(0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006)
Small Storm -0.016* 0.003 0.001 -0.015** 0.002 -0.001
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
Big Storm * priv -0.042** 0.052*** 0.015 -0.055*** 0.030** -0.016**
(0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007)
Small Storm * priv 0.022** -0.026*** -0.004 0.024** 0.000 -0.004
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003)
Sample Earners All Earners Earners Earners Earners
Observations 660,650 1,430,357 660,650 669,711 660,650 660,650
R-squared 0.469 0.156 0.124 0.441 0.119 0.051
Panel B: Decomposition of Impacts among Permanent and Temporary Private Sector Wage Jobs
wage/ hours/ hours/ wage/ days/ hours/
week worker earner hour earner day
Big Storm * permanent -0.022* 0.005 0.004 -0.026** 0.006 -0.002
(0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005)
Small Storm * permanent -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.007 0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Big Storm * temporary -0.028 -0.042** -0.038** 0.010 -0.027* -0.012
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009)
Small Storm * temporary 0.015 -0.009 -0.009 0.024*** -0.001 -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Sample Earners All Earners Earners Earners Earners
Observations 465,245 510,571 465,245 465,245 465,245 465,245
R-squared 0.418 0.088 0.089 0.395 0.081 0.045
Equality F-stat 0.077 5.565 4.345 3.501 4.790 1.247
Equality p-val 0.782 0.019 0.037 0.062 0.029 0.264
Notes: Results from weighted individual regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the log weekly wage
for employed individuals (Column 1), number of hours worked for employed individuals (Column 2), number
of hours worked for employed individuals earning a wage (Column 3), hourly wage for employed individuals
(Column 4), number of days worked for employed individuals earning a wage (Column 5), number of hours
worked per day for employed individuals earning a wage (Column 6). Regressions control for municipal fixed
effects, time fixed effects as well as respondent’s age, age square, education levels and gender. In Panel A
regressions include a private sector dummy. In Panel B regressions include a permanent contract dummy. The
standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential correlation within municipality. * denotes significance at
the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Panel-level results: decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Impact on Earnings and Hours (All Employees)
wage/ hours/ hours/ wage/ days/ hours/
week worker earner hour earner day
Big Storm -0.024** -0.018** -0.010 -0.019** -0.004 -0.008*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
Small Storm -0.007 -0.010** -0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.005**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Sample Earners All Earners Earners Earners Earners
Observations 267,038 699,704 277,932 267,038 277,928 277,928
R-squared 0.465 0.131 0.107 0.439 0.100 0.052
Panel B: Impact on Earnings and Hours (Same Job Type)
wage/ hours/ hours/ wage/ days/ hours/
week worker earner hour earner day
Big Storm -0.015 -0.016* 0.006 -0.021** 0.001 0.005
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
Small Storm 0.002 -0.008* 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Sample Earners All Earners Earners Earners Earners
Observations 194,717 502,444 195,728 194,717 195,726 195,726
R-squared 0.491 0.146 0.124 0.462 0.121 0.054
Mun Fe No No No No No No
Notes: Results from weighted individual regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is
the log weekly wage for employed individuals (Column 1), number of hours worked for em-
ployed individuals (Column 2), number of hours worked for employed individuals earning a
wage (Column 3), hourly wage for employed individuals (Column 4), number of days worked
for employed individuals earning a wage (Column 5), number of hours worked per day for
employed individuals earning a wage (Column 6). In Panel B, the dependent variables are a
series of dummies equal to one if: the individual is employed (Column 1), the individual has
a job (Column 2), the individual is employed but their wage is not observed (Column 3), the
individual reports a wage regardless of employment status (Column 4), the individual reports
having a job but working zero hours in the last 7 days (Column 5), the individual reports not
having a job now, but having worked in the last 3 months (Column 6). Regressions control
for time fixed effects as well as municipal fixed effects (Panel A) and individual fixed effects
(Panel B). In Panel A, regression control for the respondent’s age, age square, education lev-
els and gender. The standard errors (in parentheses) account for potential correlation within
municipality. * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5% and, *** at the 1% level.
